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Title:
Effect of destruction of North Vietnamese petroleum storage facilities on the war in South Vietnam
Date of Creation:
June 8, 1966
Date of Declassification:
July 16, 1996
Type of Document:
Report
Level of Classification:
TOP SECRET
Status of Copy:
SANITIZED
Pagination, Illustration:
30 p.
Abstract:
It is estimated that the neutralization of the bulk petroleum storage facilities in North Vietnam will not in itself preclude Hanoi's continued support of essential war activities. The immediate impact in North Vietnam will be felt in the need to convert to an alternative system of supply and distribution. The conversion program will be costly and create additional burdens for the regime. It is estimated, however, that the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam can be sustained. The impact on normal economic activity, however, would be more severe. New strains on an already burdened economic control structure and managerial talent would cause further reductions in economic activity, compound existing distribution problems, and further strain manpower resources. The attacks on petroleum storage facilities in conjunction with continuing attacks on transportation targets and armed reconnaissance against lines of communication will increase the burden and costs of supporting the war. Although previous airstrikes have destroyed about 18 percent of North Vietnam's bulk petroleum storage facilities, the country still has a capacity to store 190,000 tons of petroleum in eleven targeted facilities and in at least 31 untargeted facilities. The two most important facilities are located in Haiphong and Hanoi. They account for 116,000 tons, or 60 percent of total bulk storage capacity. There are in addition nine facilities on the JCS target list, two of which have been previously attacked. These eleven facilities, which are all vulnerable to air attack, account for 95 percent of total bulk storage capacity. The remaining 5 percent is accounted for by the small, dispersed, and untargeted facilities with a capacity of about 8,000 tons. The import and consumption of petroleum has increased significantly in recent months. Monthly imports in the first five months were at a level equivalent to an annual import of 300,000 tons, an increase of 58 percent above the 1965 levels. Data on actual consumption of petroleum are less precise. It is estimated that military and military support activities account for 55 percent of total consumption. As of 1 April 1966 the consumption of petroleum had increased by more than 20 percent above 1965 levels -- to a total of 206,000 tons. The higher level of imports, if continued for the rest of 1966, will be used to satisfy increasing petroleum requirements, both military and civilian, and to implement plans for dispersed storage of petroleum stocks. Neutralization of North Vietnam's eleven targeted petroleum storage sites, according to calculations of the Department of Defense, would require initially an estimated of 540 sorties and the expenditure of 737 tons of ordnance. Estimated civilian casualties could range from 200 to 300 persons because the facilities in urban areas are in lightly populated zones. With provisions to minimize casualties, the number could be considerably lower. It is estimated that the successful execution of the planned attack would leave North Vietnam with enough petroleum stocks to satisfy normal requirements for a period of 60 days. It is believed that within that time, with Soviet and Chinese cooperation, North Vietnam could restore the flow of petroleum supplies. If restoration of the flow, probably by rail from China, took longer than this, North Vietnam could extend these supplies to meet essential requirements for a period of 90 days by eliminating non-essential petroleum requirements.
Indexing Terms:
Declassified Documents Reference System Location:
1997-1843