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Outlook from Hanoi: factors affecting North Vietnam's policy on the war in Vietnam
Date of Creation:
February 5, 1970
Date of Declassification:
July 20, 1977
Type of Document:
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Level of Classification:
Status of Copy:
Pagination, Illustration:
23 p.
The Outlook from Hanoi: factors affecting North Vietnam's policy on the war in Vietnam [Hanoi's primary aims are to develop North Vietnam along socialist lines and to extend its control over South Vietnam. It still believes that NVN will prevail but regards the situation in SVN as threatening; 1969 COSVN Resolution 9 admits that Communist capabilities have been reduced, and Gen. Giap has stated that the Communists have ignored cardinal precepts of a "people's war"; the Communists fear that they have overemphasized military action and neglected the political and subversive base. Hanoi has assumed that its will to persist remains stronger than that of the US; NVN now finds in Vietnamization an allied strategy designed to challenge this fundamental assumption. In addition, Hanoi is suffering from manpower, leadership, and economic problems, and while Moscow and Peking would make every effort to continue deliveries, Hanoi might have grave concern for its supply lines should Sino-Soviet border fighting persist for many weeks. Hanoi has three options in attempting to rid itself of US presence: all-out military effort, involving higher losses and risks than Hanoi seems willing to contemplate; prolonged war, which is the most likely course but which would involve high casualties, put strain on North Vietnam, and offer no chance of decisive success in the near future; or negotiated settlement, which might undermine the Communist position in SVN but which would hasten US withdrawal; if the Communists should choose to negotiate, any concessions that they might make would not lead to overall settlement]. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-70. Feb. 5, 1970. 23 p. SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified July 20, 1977.
Declassified Documents Reference System Location: