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Title:
Outlook from Hanoi: factors affecting North Vietnam's policy on the war in Vietnam
Date of Creation:
February 5, 1970
Date of Declassification:
July 20, 1977
Type of Document:
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Level of Classification:
SECRET
Status of Copy:
ORIGINAL
Pagination, Illustration:
23 p.
Abstract:
The Outlook from Hanoi: factors affecting North Vietnam's policy on the war in Vietnam
[Hanoi's primary aims are to develop North
Vietnam along socialist lines and to extend
its control over South Vietnam. It still
believes that NVN will prevail but regards
the situation in SVN as threatening; 1969
COSVN Resolution 9 admits that Communist
capabilities have been reduced, and Gen. Giap
has stated that the Communists have ignored
cardinal precepts of a "people's war"; the
Communists fear that they have overemphasized
military action and neglected the political
and subversive base. Hanoi has assumed that
its will to persist remains stronger than
that of the US; NVN now finds in
Vietnamization an allied strategy designed to
challenge this fundamental assumption. In
addition, Hanoi is suffering from manpower,
leadership, and economic problems, and while
Moscow and Peking would make every effort to
continue deliveries, Hanoi might have grave
concern for its supply lines should
Sino-Soviet border fighting persist for many
weeks. Hanoi has three options in attempting
to rid itself of US presence: all-out
military effort, involving higher losses and
risks than Hanoi seems willing to
contemplate; prolonged war, which is the most likely course but which would involve high
casualties, put strain on North Vietnam, and
offer no chance of decisive success in the
near future; or negotiated settlement, which
might undermine the Communist position in SVN
but which would hasten US withdrawal; if the
Communists should choose to negotiate, any
concessions that they might make would not
lead to overall settlement]. Special National
Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-70. Feb. 5,
1970. 23 p. SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.
Declassified July 20, 1977.
Indexing Terms:
LE DUAN
LE DUC THO
NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEWS OF US POLICY ON VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEWS OF VIETNAMIZATION
NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP
NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICY ON VIETNAM WAR
NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC SITUATION
NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER
NORTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION MORALE
NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE IMPACT ON NORTH VIETNAM
LAO DONG PARTY
LE DUC THO
NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEWS OF US POLICY ON VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEWS OF VIETNAMIZATION
NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP
NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICY ON VIETNAM WAR
NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC SITUATION
NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER
NORTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION MORALE
NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE IMPACT ON NORTH VIETNAM
LAO DONG PARTY
Declassified Documents Reference System Location:
1980-31A
Link to Full Text: