Advanced search...

We hereby acknowledge the permissions granted by the Gale Group to include in this Database the abstracts provided in the Declassified Documents Reference System CD-ROM and by the Texas Tech University's Virtual Vietnam Archive to provide the links for fulltext documents.

Intelligence failures in Vietnam : suggestions for reform
Date of Creation:
January 24, 1969
Type of Document:
Level of Classification:
Status of Copy:
Pagination, Illustration:
35 p.
Intelligence Failures in Vietnam: Suggestions for Reform [lack of foresight, neglect of fundamentals, absence of clear central direction caused "three massive US intelligence failures": (1) US intelligence failed to gauge scope of war, underestimating size, strength, enemy order of battle, infiltration rates, etc.; (2) second basic failure has been neglect by US intelligence of enemy's power, the Communist Party and its related bureaucracies: the "infrastructure". Consequences of this neglect have been "momentous". The Allies' best-conceived scheme, PHOENIX program, did not get off the ground; (3) frequent inability of the Allies to fathom enemy's intentions, most prominently, the failure to predict the Tet offensive, due mostly to CIA's lack of success in espionage. Three general recommendations conclude memorandum: (a) set up Board of Inquiry to examine overall intelligence in Vietnam and elsewhere; (b) short term recommendations, geared mostly to ensure effectiveness of PHOENIX program; (c) other longer term recommendations designed to correct basic ills of intelligence research]. Memorandum, Samuel A. Adams. Jan. 24, 1969. 35 p., appendix, charts. Security classification not given. SANITIZED copy. Released date not given.
Declassified Documents Reference System Location: