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We hereby acknowledge the permissions granted by the Gale Group to include in this Database the abstracts provided in the Declassified Documents Reference System CD-ROM and by the Texas Tech University's Virtual Vietnam Archive to provide the links for fulltext documents.

Title:
Situation in South Vietnam
Date of Creation:
August 11, 1965
Date of Declassification:
February 16, 1993
Type of Document:
Weekly report
Level of Classification:
NOT GIVEN
Status of Copy:
SANITIZED
Pagination, Illustration:
24 p.
Abstract:
The two-day meeting on 4-5 August of the ruling military Directorate, and Premier Ky's subsequent press conference to announce the results of the meeting, dominated last week's political scene in Saigon. Contrary to advance speculation, there was no indication that the Directorate had expressed dissatisfaction with Ky's performance. Some of the decisions emanating from the meeting--particularly those projecting the possible punishment of once powerful officers now "exiled" abroad or in disfavor at home--did little to dispel rumors of continuing political rivalry. These rumors appear to have been abetted by suspicions among disparate Vietnamese political and religious circles that the return of Ambassador Lodge presages some new US political move, and that Premier Ky's mid-August mission in Taiwan and Thailand--about which few details have been provided--was deliberately timed to avoid Lodge's arrival. Ky's extemperaneous remarks at his press conference concerning the proper limits of friendship with foreign countries further served to fan such speculation. While reports from various Vietnamese sources have indicated increasingly open political maneuvering by General Thi, I Corps Commander, particularly among antigovernment Buddhists in Hue, there continues to be no firm evidence of any early move against Ky. With the exception of the current action at Duc Co, the relative lull since mid-July in Viet Cong battalion-size or larger commitments has continued. Small-scale Viet Cong activity in the area around Saigon and in the delta provinces has intensified. The current Viet Cong modus operandi generally conforms to a typical revolutionary warfare pattern. In the face of increasing US forces, and having sustained many casualties so far during their monsoon campaign, the Viet Cong probably have found it necessary to regroup, replace, and re-equip, and at the same time probe and assess the changing situation. For example, Viet Cong efforts to test and evaluate US reactions have been evident at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Bien Hoa. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong can maintain a hold on the country by continuing interdiction, sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, and harassing small-scale attacks, and withhold attacks in battalion strength or larger until exploitable opportunities are developed or presented.
Declassified Documents Reference System Location:
1994-000036